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California Practicum
The California Practicum is a series of articles dealing with subjects of sig-
nificance to California attorneys. The purpose of the Practicum is to inform
the reader of practical problems on the cutting edge of California law in both
the state and federal forums, and to act as an initial resource for finding so-
lutions to those problems.
The Sanction Provision of the New California Civil
Discovery Act, Section 2023: Will it Make a
Difference or is it Just Another "Paper Tiger"?*
A system of discovery would be next to worthless unless it included sanctions




The new California Civil Discovery Act of 1986 became effective on
July 1, 1987. The Act was the culmination of a three year effort by a
joint commission appointed by both the state bar and judicial council.
The result was to completely revise the original 1957 system of civil
discovery.' The revision had three goals: "(1) to identify discovery
abuses, and eliminate or at least reduce these abuses; (2) to codify the
large accumulation of common law that had [accrued] over the three
decades since [the] enactment of the [prior] 1957 law; and (3) to im-
prove the organization and wording of the law."2 One of the main
sections revised by the New California Civil Discovery Act is the
* The term "paper tiger" comes from Rosenberg, New Philosophy of Sanctions,
in NEW FEDERAL CIVIL DISCOVERY RULES SOURCEBOOK 140, 141 (W. Treadwell ed.
1972).
t 2 J. HOGAN, MODERN CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY 3D § 14.01 (1981). James E. Ho-
gan, Professor of Law at U.C. Davis, was the reporter to the joint commission charged
with the task of drafting the New California Discovery Act.
1. DEERING'S CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: SPECIAL DISCOVERY ACT
PAMPHLET 5 (Bancroft-Whitney 1987).
2. Epstein, The Civil Discovery Act of 1986, L.A. LAW. Sept. 1987, at 19. The au-
thor, Judge Norman L. Epstein, is a Los Angeles Superior Court judge and chair of the
Los Angeles Bar Association's Ad Hoc Committee on Discovery.
sanction provision embodied in section 2023.3 Formerly, sanctions
were governed by section 2034.4 When it first appeared, the section
was praised for following the federal trend.5 Since that time, the fed-
eral government has revised its sanctions provisions to solve many of
the procedural problems which plagued the former statute.6 How-
ever, California was slow to institute similar revisions,7 and problems
continued to plague the statute in the form of misuses of pretrial dis-
covery. A common example involves the case of a large defense firm
exploiting a sole practitioner by bombarding him with paperwork in
the form of elongated interrogatories and frivolous motions. Such
situations fostered the impression that misuse of pretrial discovery is
rampant, and is a widespread problem among the legal profession in
California.8
The new sanction provision embodied in section 2023 is designed to
minimize misuses in pretrial discovery. The section adopts a more
organized and structural approach as compared to the former law.
Although the Reporter's Notes to the Proposed Act of 1986 suggest
the revisions are primarily definitional, with only a subtle change in
the monetary sanctions, 9 it is evident that many more substantial
3. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1988). For WESTLAW ® re-
search select the CACS or CAST database and use this search query: Sanctions &
"New Civil Discovery Act" & Monetary or Issue or Evidence of Terminating or Con-
tempt. WESTLAW is a registered trademark of West Publishing Company.
4. Former CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 2034 (West 1983) (repealed 1987) [hereinafter
Former CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE].
5. The wording and language followed that of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
number 37. FED. R. CIV. P. 37. See THE RUTTER GROUP, NEW CIVIL DISCOVERY ACT
§ 8:2 (1987).
6. Since 1957, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been substantially re-
vised on two occasions; once in 1970 and again in 1980. See Rosenberg, New Philosophy
of Sanctions, in NEW FEDERAL CIVIL DISCOVERY RULES SOURCEBOOK (W. Treadwell
ed. 1972). Referring to the 1970 revision, the author provides:
Revised Rule 37 tries to create a streamlined, updated, modernized apparatus
for sanctions against obstructions or aggressions in the discovery process.
Rule 37 provides sharper teeth, has more flexible jaws, and has quicker re-
sponsiveness to abuses in the discovery process than was available before. It
keys the sanction provisions to the changed provisions on scope, mechanics,
and tempo of discovery.
Id. at 140.
7. See Comment, The Decline and Fall of Sanctions in California Discovery:
Time to Modernize California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 2034, 9 U.S.F. L. REV.
360, 361 (1974). The author analyzes both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (prior
to the 1980 amendment) and the former California Code of Civil Procedure, § 2034. Id.
at 388-90; see also Sherwood, Curbing Discovery Abuse: Sanctions Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the California Code of Civil Procedure, 21 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 567 (1981).
8. CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, PREPARING NOW FOR DIS-
COVERY UNDER THE NEW ACT 5 (Oct./Nov. 1986) [hereinafter CEB].
9. Id. at 134 n.8. The reporter's notes are written by James E. Hogan. The rele-
vant portions state:
CCP § 2023 SANCTIONS FOR ABUSES OF DISCOVERY Subdivision (a)-
Abuses of Discovery Process. Because of the widespread concern with abuse
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changes are involved. Indeed, the very act of codifying thirty years of
developed common law through appellate court decisions into a new
statute cannot conceivably be done without producing significant
changes in the act itself. In view of the federal courts' success in lim-
iting discovery abuses, a large measure of the new reforms follow the
federal trend.1o Section 2023 even surpasses the federal rules and
breaks new ground, for example, with its adaptation of the labor law
concept of "meet and confer" requirements to counsel.1 1
This article will carefully examine the new sanctions provision,
section 2023, and compare it to the old provision, former section 2034.
Part II discusses the statutory list of discovery misuses, and Part III
deals specifically with meet and confer misuse. The various types of
sanctions are dealt with in Part IV. Part V considers the impact of
the frivolous motion in section 128.5 and Part VI analyzes miscellane-
ous concerns relating to sanctions being imposed. Finally, Part VII
sets forth the requirements for a request for sanctions motion.
The focus of this article is to highlight significant changes in the
law and give illustrations which will help practitioners understand
how the new sanction provisions affect them. Finally, this article
of the discovery process at the present time, the Commission deems it desira-
ble to list in a general way the major categories of actions that it regards as an
abuse. [Compare proposed Section 2019(a), listing the methods of discovery.]
Although the Commission has tried to make this list a comprehensive one, it
recognizes that other categories of abuse may develop. Accordingly, this list
of abuses is illustrative, not exhaustive. It is arguable that, in view of the de-
tailed regulations of the discovery process in the various sections governing
the individual methods of discovery, this subdivision is unnecessary. However,
the Commission feels that the subdivision underscores the importance of con-
ducting discovery in a manner that does not abuse the methods provided to
achieve its goals.
Subdivision (b)-Sanctions for Discovery Abuse. This subdivision, derived
from the present CCP § 2034, is mainly definitional in function. Throughout
the proposed Discovery Act, the sanctions that may be imposed for any partic-
ular discovery dereliction are described simply as a "monetary sanction," an
"issue sanction," an "evidence sanction," a "terminating sanction," or a "con-
tempt sanction," followed by a cross-reference to this section to ascertain just
what those terms mean. This subdivision enables the Commission to imple-
ment in a manageable way its decision that the sanctions available for a par-
ticular breach of a discovery duty should be specified in any particular section
of the Discovery Act that creates that duty. The Commission believes that
this approach to the matter of sanctions is preferable to that used in the pres-
ent Discovery Act, which requires constant reference to CCP. § 2034, a cum-
bersome statute containing almost 1,400 words.
Id. at 134-35.
10. See sources cited supra note 5.
11. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(a)(9) (West Supp. 1988); see infra note 17 and ac-
companying text.
will point out problems of ambiguity and open questions associated
with the new statute.
II. MISUSES OF PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
The new law adopts a fresh approach by listing nine acts which
constitute discovery misuses.12 The list is illustrative rather than ex-
haustive.13 The Joint Commission, which wrote the new act, felt that
this approach was desirable "because of the widespread concern with
abuse of the discovery process .... "14 The list includes:
(1) Persisting, over objection and without substantial justification, in an at-
tempt to obtain information or materials that are outside the scope of permis-
sible discovery.
(2) Using a discovery method in a manner that does not comply with its
specified procedures.
(3) Employing a discovery method in a manner or to an extent that causes
unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and
expense.
(4) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery.
(5) Making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to
discovery.
(6) Making an evasive response to discovery.
(7) Disobeying a court order to provide discovery.
(8) Making or opposing, unsuccessfully and without substantial justifica-
tion, a motion to compel or to limit discovery.
(9) Failing to confer in person, by telephone, or by letter with an opposing
party or attorney in a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve informally
any dispute concerning discovery, if the section governing a particular discov-
ery motion requires the filing of a declaration stating facts showing that such
an attempt has been made. Notwithstanding the outcome of the particular
discovery motion, the court shall impose a monetary sanction ordering that
any party or attorney who fails to confer as required pay the reasonable ex-
penses, including attorneys fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that
conduct. 15
The significance of listing misuses is twofold. First, it gives timid
judges a solid foundation from which to work. It relieves them, in
part, from making discretionary judgment calls, by providing a statu-
tory framework to support the imposition of sanctions. Thus, they
can take comfort in the knowledge that the sanctioned behavior is
defined as a misuse by the act. Second, the listing adds clarity and
predictability to pretrial procedures, enabling both judges and attor-
neys to better understand whether or not specific acts constitute mis-
uses. Certain acts are defined as misuses in the statute, and are
consequently subject to little, if any, subjective interpretation. Sec-
12. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(a)(1)-(9) (West Supp. 1988).
13. CEB, supra note 8, at 134. This approach was followed in § 2019(a)(1)-(6)
which lists several means by which discovery can be obtained. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 2019(a)(1)-(6) (West Supp. 1988).
14. CEB, supra note 8, at 134.
15. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2023(a)(1)-(9) (West Supp. 1988).
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tion 2023(a) clarifies what does and does not constitute a misuse,
thereby further deterring such misuses.
III. MEET AND CONFER
The "meet and confer"16 requirement in subsection (a)(9) is not en-
tirely new to California discovery procedures. The concept originated
in labor law pertaining to resolving differences between employers
and employees in the public sector.17 With regard to discovery proce-
dures, the meet and confer requirement has been utilized for a few
years on a local level.18 On a statewide level, the meet and confer
rule originally pertained only to motions to compel answers or fur-
ther answers to interrogatories, requests for admissions, or motions
to protect the responding party.1 9 Later, this requirement was ex-
tended to all motions to compel or limit discov'ery.20 With the enact-
16. Id. § 2023(a)(9).
17. California labor law embraces the "meet and confer" concept in CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 3500-3511 (West 1980). The act defines meet and confer as follows:
"meet and confer in good faith" means that a public agency, or such repre-
sentatives as it may designate, and representatives of recognized employee or-
ganizations, shall have the mutual obligation personally to meet and confer
promptly upon request by either party and continue for a reasonable period of
time in order to exchange freely information, opinions, and proposals, and to
endeavor to reach agreement on matters within the scope of representation
prior to the adoption by the public agency of its final budget for the ensuing
year. The process should include adequate time for the resolution of impasses
where specific procedures for such resolution are contained in local rule, regu-
lation, or ordinance, or when such procedures are utilized by mutual consent.
Id. § 3505. For a national overview of the concept in labor law, see Edwards, An Over-
view of the "Meet and Conffer" States-Where are We Going?, 16 LAW QUADRANGLE
NOTES 10 (1972).
18. Two local jurisdictions which have imposed meet and confer requirements are
San Francisco and Los Angeles. See THE RUTTER GROUP, supra note 5, §§ 8:1018-8:1031
for a discussion of the impact of the meet and confer requirement on local jurisdictions
already recognizing it. A foremost question is whether the new Discovery Act over-
rides the local requirements for a filing of joint statements. Id. §§ 8:1024-8:1030.
19. CAL. R. CT. 222.1 which was adopted January 1, 1980. The rule provides:
A motion to compel answers or further answers to interrogatories or re-
quests for admissions or to protect the responding party shall include a decla-
ration stating facts to show that prior to the filing thereof counsel for the
moving party made a reasonable attempt to resolve the objections and dis-
puted issues with opposing counsel but the attempt was unsuccessful. If the
court finds that there was no good reason for the refusal or failure to resolve
the matter, it may order any persons at fault to pay to the moving party the
amount of reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion including rea-
sonable attorney's fees.
Id.
20. CAL. R. CT. 339, which superseded CRC 222.1, Jan. 1, 1984. The rule states:
A motion to compel or limit discovery shall include a declaration or affidavit
stating facts to show that prior to filing the motion counsel for the moving
ment of the new California Discovery Act, the meet and confer
requirement now applies to almost all the specified provisions.21
The statute provides that if the section governing a particular dis-
covery motion requires the parties to meet and confer, one party
must confer either in person, or by telephone, or by letter with the
opposing party or attorney in a reasonable and good faith attempt to
resolve informally any dispute concerning discovery prior to filing a
motion.22 Thereafter, if one side files a motion seeking sanctions,
that party must include a declaration stating facts showing that such
an attempt has been made.23
For example, in a wrongful termination case alleging several
causes of action and seeking punitive damages, the plaintiff's attor-
ney files interrogatories inquiring into the company-employer's net
worth. The defendant refuses to answer. The plaintiff's attorney
wishes to seek sanctions coupled with an order to compel answers,
but he must first meet and confer with the opposing counsel. After a
deposition of one of the defendants in the action, the two sides begin
to discuss the interrogatories and are able to resolve the problem
party made a reasonable attempt to resolve the objections and disputed issues
with opposing counsel in person, by telephone, or by letter, but the attempt
was unsuccessful. Failure to comply with this rule or to attempt to resolve
the matter in good faith may be deemed an action not based on good faith
which is frivolous or which causes unnecessary delay under section 128.5 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
Id. The new Discovery Act has superseded the California Rules of Court. DEERING'S
CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: SPECIAL DISCOVERY ACT PAMPHLET, supra
note 1, at 5.
21. See 2 J. DEMEO, CALIFORNIA DEPOSITION AND DISCOVERY PRACTICE
§ 42.03[2][b] (1987). The author lists eight instances in which the meet and confer pro-
vision does not apply:
(1) The imposition of a contempt sanction against a deponent for disobedi-
ence of a deposition subpoena. [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2020(h) (West Supp.
1988)];
(2) A motion for an order compelling responses to interrogatories.
[§ 2030(k)];
(3) A motion for an order compelling a response to a demand for inspection
of documents and things. [§ 2031(k)];
(4) A motion for an order compelling a responding party to permit inspec-
tion of documents or things in accordance with that party's statement of com-
pliance. [§ 2031(m)];
(5) A motion by a defendant to compel response and compliance with a de-
mand for a physical examination in a case in which plaintiff is seeking recov-
ery for personal injuries. [§ 2032(c)(6)];
(6) A motion for an order imposing sanctions for failure to submit to or pro-
duce another for a physical examination. [§ 2032(f)];
(7) A motion for a protective order during a physical examination.
[§ 2032(g)(1)];
(8) A motion for an order that the genuineness of documents or truth of
matters specified in a request for admission be deemed admitted. [§ 2033(k)].
Id.
22. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(a)(9) (West Supp. 1988).
23. Id.
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within ten minutes.24 The resolution saves both parties the cost of
filing a motion or answering and having to appear in court to argue
the motion. In addition, the meet and confer rule encourages cooper-
ation between the two parties to the suit.25
Practitioners should note that sanctions may be imposed for a vio-
lation of the meet and confer requirement regardless of whether the
party actually misused pretrial discovery. 26 The statute reads that
"[n]otwithstanding the outcome of the particular discovery motion,
the court shall impose a monetary sanction ordering that any party
or attorney who fails to confer . . . [must] pay the reasonable ex-
penses, including attorneys fees, incurred by anyone as a result of
that conduct." 27 It is worth noting that the meet and confer require-
ment pertains to attorneys as well as nonattorneys. 28
While not entirely new to the California discovery process, the
meet and confer requirement of the California Discovery Act will
have the immediate impact of minimizing misuses in pretrial discov-
ery by alleviating many of the problems inherent in pretrial discov-
ery. Large firms, for example, no longer have the advantage of being
able to burden sole practitioners with excess paperwork. Incentives
are built into the meet and confer requirement which will save attor-
neys time and money by not forcing them to resolve all disputes in
court. It now behooves counsel to meet and informally resolve their
disputes, rather than to judicially contest every disagreement. In
turn, judicial resources will be better utilized, resolving major dis-
putes as opposed to mediating minor differences between counsel.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the meet and confer provi-
sion is that it does not impose a major burden on attorneys or the
parties. A telephone call can serve to resolve matters, thus eliminat-
ing the expenditure of increased time and expense. Although the tel-
ephone was surely used in attempts to resolve differences under the
former law, attorneys now have an added incentive to resolve differ-
24. The example cited is drawn from the author's law clerking experience in San
Jose, California in 1987. By utilizing "meet and confer," the two sides resolved their
disputes without having to exert time and money filing and arguing a motion in court.
The "meet and confer" did not prove inconvenient for the parties since it was con-
ducted during the course of negotiating other matters of discovery.
25. L.A. Daily J., July 2, 1987, at 1, col. 2. The comment is by Judith Bloom who is
the immediate past chair of the Los Angeles County Bar Association's Trial Lawyers
Section.
26. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2023(a)(9) (West Supp. 1988).
27. Id.
28. The term used in the statute is "anyone." Id.
ences informally, as they are subject to sanctions if they do not do so.
The direct effect of the meet and confer provision will be to en-
courage efficient resolution of pretrial disputes; the indirect effect
will be to minimize pretrial discovery misuse by compelling parties to
attempt to resolve differences during the discovery phase. An ag-
grieved party need no longer tolerate abuse for an elongated period
of time while waiting for the court to issue a protective order; under
the meet and confer provision, the party can act immediately to re-
solve the grievance.
IV. TYPES OF SANCTIONS
The new law retains most of the sanctions embodied in the former
law. The statute identifies five different sanctions in the order of
least to most severe; specifically, monetary,29issue,30 evidence,31 ter-
minating,32 and contempt sanctions. 33 Although not as clearly de-
fined, each of these sanctions was contained in the former law.34 The
one exception is the arrest sanction which was formerly recognized,
but is not specified in the new act.35 The contempt sanction, how-
ever, is substituted in its place.
The new law is more organized and structured than the former
statute. Instead of being a cumbersome section composed of almost
1,400 words, the new statute labels the particular sanctions available
for specified actions throughout the act. These sanctions are followed
by a cross-reference to section 2023 which defines exactly what those
terms mean.36 The Joint Commission desired that each particular
breach of a discovery duty would be specified in the section of the
Discovery Act which creates that duty.37 The result is a more organ-
ized and predictable approach for practitioners. (See Appendix).
One who engages in a particular misuse of pretrial discovery can
consult the statute to see which sanctions apply to a given type of
29. Id. § 2023(b)(1).
30. Id. § 2023(b)(2) (court orders designated facts to be taken as established).
31. Id. § 2023(b)(3) (court prohibits party engaging in discovery abuse from intro-
ducing designated matters in evidence).
32. Id. § 2023(b)(4) (court may impose order to strike, stay proceedings, dismiss
the action, or render a judgment of default).
33. Id. § 2023(b)(5).
34. Former CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(b)(2)(D), 2034(c) (West 1983) (monetary
sanction); id. § 2034(b)(2)(A) (issue sanction); id. § 2034(b)(2)(B) (evidence sanction);
id. § 2034(b)(2)(C) (terminating sanction); id. § 2034(b)(1) (contempt sanction).
35. Arrest sanction was embodied in former CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(b)(2)(E)
(West 1983). The section provided that the court "may make any orders in regard to
the refusal [to obey a court discovery order] which are just, including ... an order di-
recting the arrest of any party or agent of a party for disobeying any of such orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental or blood examination." Id.
36. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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conduct. For example, an advocate who fails to comply with a court
order compelling responses to interrogatories can turn to section
2030(k)38 and determine that this conduct may subject him or her to
monetary, issue, evidence, and/or terminating sanctions. (See Appen-
dix). The cross-reference to section 2023 then enables the attorney to
ascertain what those sanctions entail.
This format enables attorneys to predict the extent of possible lia-
bility which their actions will subject them to, since all potential
sanctions which may be imposed are set out in the statute. Conse-
quently, both judges and attorneys can fully realize the ramifications
of specific misuses and take steps accordingly. The result is more
predictability' and less discretion in pretrial discovery.
A. Monetary Sanctions
The new subsection concerning monetary sanctions reflects three
significant changes from the former law. First, the burden of proof
for substantial justification now rests with the non-moving party.
Second, sanctions are mandatorily imposed in many instances. Third,
anyone, not just a party to the lawsuit, can seek recourse for harm
suffered due to another's misuse of pretrial discovery.
The burden of proving substantial justification no longer rests with
the moving party but now shifts to the non-moving party.3 9 The for-
mer law provided that if the court found counsel's refusal, failure, or
objection to comply with the discovery process to be without substan-
tial justification, it was free to impose monetary sanctions.40 The
onus fell on the moving party to show that the non-moving party had
not acted with substantial justification, thereby justifying an award of
monetary sanctions.41
The new law follows the language and the approach of the federal
courts by stating that "after notice to any affected party, person, or
38. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2030(k) (West Supp. 1988). The relevant portions of
the rule provide:
The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Section 2023 against any
party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to
compel a response to interrogatories.... If a party then fails to obey an order
compelling answers, the court may make those orders that are just, including
the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating
sanction under Section 2023. In lieu of, or in addition to that sanction, the
court may impose a monetary sanction under Section 2023.
Id.
39. See generally 2 J. DEMEO, supra note 21, § 42.10[1][B].
40. Former CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(a).
41. Id.
attorney, and after opportunity for hearing,42... the court shall im-
pose the sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction
acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make
the imposition of the sanction unjust."43 In effect, this creates a pre-
sumption of abuse on the part of the non-moving attorney.44 The test
of "substantial justification" is unchanged; however, the non-moving
party is now forced to prove a defense. One judge comments that the
desired result is "that sanctions will be awarded in far more cases
than before. And that, in turn, is supposed to encourage parties and
their counsel to cooperate with discovery and avoid unnecessary
court proceedings."45 No longer can an advocate who is accused of a
pretrial discovery abuse, which mandates the imposition of a mone-
tary sanction remain silent, awaiting the moving party's substantia-
tion of his claim. Rather, the attorney will be forced to assert
justifiable reasons for his conduct. Advocates who are unsure if their
actions are justified will not act, or will at least hesitate before acting,
because they will be required to prove their reasons in a court of law.
The inconvenience of having to go to court and explain questionable
conduct, coupled with the anxiety about the possible outcome, will
deter many practitioners.
Shifting the burden of showing substantial justification to the non-
moving party eliminates the "willfulness" requirement of the old
law.46 In a case where one side refuses to answer an interrogatory,
the former law provided that the party seeking sanctions had to
demonstrate that the opposing party's objections "were insubstantial,
were interposed for purposes of delay or harassment, or were other-
wise unreasonable."47 The new law shifts the focus away from show-
ing willfulness on the part of the non-moving party, to the non-
moving party having to prove some justifiable excuse for his
actions.48
The second major difference between the old and the new rule is
the imposition of mandatory monetary sanctions. 49 The language of
42. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(b) (West Supp. 1988).
43. Id. § 2023(b)(1).
44. L.A. Daily J., July 2, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
45. Epstein, supra note 2, at 19, 21.
46. See 2 J. DEMEO supra note 21, § 42.10[6].
47. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 80 Cal. App. 3d 1, 15, 145 Cal. Rptr.
316, 324 (1978) (action to recover under long-term disability insurance policy, wherein
defendant failed to permit discovery in avenues open to class action and sought a re-
straining order against plaintiff's motion to compel discovery. The court held that
plaintiff's award of $300 in monetary sanctions was improper.).
48. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988). (sanction imposed unless
court finds party acted with substantial justification).
49. See 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Discovery and Depositions § 317 (1987); see also Sherwood,
supra note 7, at 567. The author commented in 1981 that the state should mandatorily
impose monetary sanctions. Id. at 610-11.
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the new act replaces "may" with "shall" for the purpose of imposing
sanctions, 50 thereby compelling the court to apply sanctions if there
is a misuse of a specified provision of the Act.51 Under the former
statute the trial judge had absolute discretion to determine whether
the actions of one advocate constituted a misuse, and whether these
actions were deserving of the imposition of sanctions. The new stat-
ute usurps, for the most part, the judges' discretion as to what consti-
tutes a misuse.
An optimistic member of the joint council responsible for making
the reforms comments: "Judges will take it as a mandate to get very
tough on discovery abuse, and will probably be very pleased to be
able to do this."52 Courts only retain discretion to decide whether
there is substantial justification or other reasons for the misuse. In
addition, litigants will be better able to predict whether they will be
sanctioned for certain discovery misuses.
The amount of the monetary sanction award should become stan-
dardized so that it will be based on misuses of pretrial discovery
rather than judges' sentiments. This point may be somewhat under-
cut by the requirement that the courts determine whether the attor-
ney's actions were substantially justified. Instead of refusing to
award sanctions because a party's behavior does not constitute a mis-
use of pretrial discovery, judges may find the actions to be a misuse
but deny the imposition of monetary sanctions on the grounds that
the actions were substantially justified.53 Although the court still has
discretion, the determination of misuse is generally no longer subject
to judicial interpretation. Henceforth, sanctions are likely to be im-
posed more frequently for abusive actions in pretrial discovery.
In addition to mandating the imposition of monetary sanctions, the
new law leaves full discretion with the courts to decide whether acts
not specifically mentioned in the new statute do, in fact, constitute a
misuse and require the imposition of monetary sanctions. 54 Section
2023(b)(1) provides that the court may impose a monetary sanction
where a person engages in the misuse of pretrial discovery or where
a person unsuccessfully asserts that another has engaged in the mis-
50. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988); see infra note 55 and ac-
companying text.
51. Id.; see also 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Discovery and Depositions § 317 (1987).
52. L.A. Daily J., July 2, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
53. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2023(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988); see also infra note
55 and accompanying text discussing the needed flexibility maintained by this rule.
54. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
use of pretrial discovery.55 Consequently, this gives the court system
needed flexibility to determine whether actions not specified by the
new act constitute a misuse.
The final change that the discovery act makes is that a person
seeking sanctions due to an advocate's misuse of pretrial discovery
processes does not have to be a "party" to the suit.56 The new act
uses the term "anyone" which implies that third parties victimized by
pretrial procedures can seek recourse against the abusing litigant.57
For example, a witness to an auto accident, who is due to be deposed,
arrives at the place of deposition only to be informed that one of the
attorneys cannot attend. A new time is scheduled and the witness
again arrives only to learn that the deposition was cancelled and that
one party failed to notify the deponent. Assuming that the court
finds one attorney has misused the discovery process, the deponent
will now be able to seek monetary sanctions.
Whether the courts will have jurisdiction over third parties is an
open question.5 8 If the third party is a witness subpoenaed to testify
or attend a deposition, jurisdiction will be based on the consent of the
parties involved in the immediate action. As for instances regarding
non-subpoenaed third parties, the question of establishing jurisdiction
55. Id. § 2023(b). This gives the courts a needed flexibility as pointed out in the
Reporter's Notes to the Proposed Act of 1986 which quote the Advisory Committee to
the Federal Rules. The relevant portions provide:
This wording is taken from FRCivP (sic] 37(a)(4), as amended in 1970. The
Advisory Committee provided the following explanation for this change:
At present, an award of expenses is made only if the losing party or person is
found to have acted without substantial justification. The change requires
that expenses be awarded unless the conduct of the losing party or person is
found to have been substantially justified. The test of 'substantial justifica-
tion' remains, but the change in language is intended to encourage judges to
be more alert to abuses occurring in the discovery process. On many occa-
sions, to be sure, the dispute over discovery between the parties is genuine,
though ultimately resolved one way or the other by the court. In such cases,
the losing party is substantially justified in carrying the matter to court. But
the rules should deter the abuse implicit in carrying or forcing a discovery dis-
pute to court when no genuine dispute exists.
And the potential or actual imposition of expenses is virtually the sole formal
sanction in the rules to deter a party from pressing to a court hearing frivo-
lous requests for or objections to discovery. ...
The proposed change provides in effect that expenses should ordinarily be im-
posed unless a court finds that the losing party acted justifiably in carrying his
point to court. At the same time, a necessary flexibility is maintained, since
the court retains the power to find that other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust-as where the prevailing party acted unjustifiably. The
amendment does not significantly narrow the discretion of the court, but
rather presses the court to address itself to abusive practices.
CEB, supra note 8, at 135-36.
56. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 2023(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
57. Id.; see also 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Discovery and Depositions § 316 (1987). The au-
thor notes that the former law did apply to a non-party to the suit, namely a witness
whose responses were sought to be compelled in a motion requesting sanctions. Id.
58. 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Discovery and Depositions § 316 (1987).
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remains open. Clearly, without jurisdiction, the courts cannot award
sanctions.59 Permitting "anyone" to recover monetary sanctions ex-
pands the scope of liability for misuses of the pretrial procedures.
The impact of these three changes will be to expand the scope of
liability for misuses of pretrial discovery. Additionally, the changes
impose mandatory sanctions for certain misuses in pretrial discovery,
and shift the burden to the one accused of a particular misuse to
show substantial justification or other reasons why sanctions should
not be imposed. The changes will have more efficacy in deterring
discovery abuses than the prior law because there are greater costs
and risks associated with misuses of pretrial discovery. 60
B. 'Issue Sanctions
The new law does not make any significant departure from the old
law with respect to issue sanctions. Former section 2034(b)(2)(A)
provided that the court may take facts "to be established for the pur-
poses of the action in accordance with the claim of the party ob-
taining the order."61 Former subsection 2034(b)(2)(B) adds that the
court may refuse "to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses. . ". ."62 The new subsection 2023(b)(2)
merely combines these two features of issue sanctions under the
same heading.63 The end result is that the substance of the law re-
mains substantially the same.
The Act provides that after giving notice to any affected party, per-
son, or attorney, and opportunity for hearing, the court may take two
courses of action.64 First, it may order that "the designated facts
shall be taken as established in the action in accordance with the
claim of the party adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery
process."65 Second, the court may impose an "order prohibiting any
party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from support-
ing or opposing designated claims or defenses."66
59. Id
60. In referring to circumstances before the new law's enactment, Martin Quinn,
member of the Northern Section of the Discovery Committee comments: "We're look-
ing to put some teeth into sanctions ... in part by making them mandatory rather than
discretionary." CAL. LAW. June 1984, at 49.
61. Former CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(b)(2)(A) (West 1983).
62. I& § 2034(b)(2)(B).
63. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988).
64. Id. § 2023(b).
65. Id. § 2023(b)(2).
66. Id.
C. Evidence Sanctions
The new law regarding evidence sanctions uses broader language
than the former statute. The former section 2034(b)(2)(B) dealt with
three instances wherein the court could exclude evidence.6 7 First, it
could refuse to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose des-
ignated claims or defenses. 68 The new law embodies this in the "is-
sue sanctions" section.69 The former statute also provided that the
court could prevent disobedient parties from introducing evidence,
documents or items of testimony, and from introducing evidence of
the physical or mental or blood condition of the person sought to be
examined.7 0
The new law simply states that "the court may impose an evidence
sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of
the discovery process from introducing matters into evidence,"71
which largely follows the federal rules.72 It dictates a broader scope
of evidence that may be excluded at trial or in the pleadings. The
former statute merely provided that evidence of testimony or de-
scriptions of a person's physical or mental condition could be subject
to exclusion. Consequently, the new evidence sanction uses broader
language but, in substance, closely follows the prior law.
D. Terminating Sanctions
The four components of the terminating sanction in the new law
exactly mirror those in the old law.73 Consequently, case law decided
pursuant to the former statute is helpful in understanding the impact
of terminating sanctions under the current law. First, the law pro-
vides that pleadings or parts of pleadings of any party engaging in
abuse of the discovery process may be stricken.7 4 This has been in-
terpreted by the courts to mean also that the unsuccessful imposition
of a lesser sanction is not a prerequisite to the use of default.75
Second, the law provides that proceedings may be stayed subject to
67. Former CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2034(b)(2)(B).
68. Id. § 2034(b)(2)(B).
69. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988).
70. Former CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(b)(2)(B).
71. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(b)(3) (West Supp. 1988).
72. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
73. Both the former section 2034(b)(2)(C) and the new section 2023(b)(4) describe
the same four orders which fall under the terminating sanction.
74. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(b)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1988).
75. Housing Auth. of Alameda v. Gomez, 26 Cal. App. 3d 366, 371, 102 Cal. Rptr.
657, 659 (1972) (action to recover possession of certain buildings and to obtain money
damages wherein defendant failed at least twice to appear and be deposed. The court
struck defendant's answer and cross-complaint and entered a default judgment against
defendant).
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one party's obeying a discovery order.76
Third, in the event of abuse of pretrial discovery, the law provides
that either a part of or the whole action may be dismissed.77 Prior
case law held that dismissal without consideration of the merits of
the case is fundamentally unjust unless the conduct of the adversely
affected party interfered with the court's mission in seeking truth
and justice.78 Dismissal is seen as a sanction of last resort available
to the judiciary, not merely as a penal measure against the disobedi-
ent party, but also as a deterrent.79 Moreover, the unsuccessful im-
position of a lesser sanction is not a prerequisite to an order for
dismissal.80 Persistent hindering by either a plaintiff or a cross-com-
plainant party of a defendant's requests for discovery results in a pre-
sumption, as a matter of law, that his or her cause of action is
without merit and dismissal is just.81
76. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(b)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1988).
77. Id. § 2023(b)(4)(C).
78. Morgan v. Ransom, 95 Cal. App. 3d 667, 670, 157 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215 (1979) (at-
torney malpractice action wherein plaintiff failed to answer an interrogatory sent by
defendant. The court held that sanctions imposed for plaintiff's failure to answer the
interrogatory were unjust.).
79. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643
(1975) (antitrust suit wherein petitioners failed to answer written interrogatories. The
court held that striking pleadings and entering a dismissal was a valid action which can
be used to deter such abuses.).
80. Kaplan v. Eldorado Ins. Co., 55 Cal. App. 3d 587, 591-92, 127 Cal. Rptr. 699, 702
(1976) (action to recover under uninsured motorist coverage policy, wherein plaintiff
failed to make himself available for deposition and physical exam. The court held that
commitment to an academic program was not a sufficient legal excuse and dismissal
without any lesser sanctions being imposed was valid.).
81. See Lumpkin v. Friedman, 131 Cal. App. 3d 450, 453-54, 456, 182 Cal. Rptr. 378,
380-81 (1982) (malicious prosecution suit wherein plaintiff failed to provide essential
evidence, subpoena necessary witnesses, and present evidence in a proper form, caus-
ing judgment to be entered against him. The court held that the dismissal was valid
since plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery procedures elicits a presumption that
his action lacks any merit); see also Bernstein v. Allstate Ins. Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 449,
451, 173 Cal. Rptr. 841, 842 (1981) (action to recover against insurer for its failure to
defend or pay amount of damages under policy wherein plaintiff failed to answer in-
terrogatories and court dismissed the suit. The court of appeal held that persistent re-
fusal to make discovery results in presumption that the cause of action asserted lacks
merit.); Kahn v. Kahn, 68 Cal. App. 3d 372, 383, 137 Cal. Rptr. 332, 337-38 (1977) (prop-
erty dispute between former partners in a furniture business wherein plaintiff failed
to obey discovery orders and the suit was dismissed. The court held that the persistent
failure to comply with discovery strengthens the presumption that one cause of action
lacks merit.).
The law formerly held that the dismissal judgment of plaintiff's cause of action can
be used in a malicious prosecution case later brought by the defendant. Lumpkin v.
Friedman, 131 Cal. App. 3d 450, 455-56, 182 Cal. Rptr. 378, 381 (1982).
Fourth, the law provides that a default judgment may be entered,8 2
but it should not be used when a lesser sanction would have served
the same purpose, since the result is to give a windfall to the moving
party.8 3 This terminating sanction should be used sparingly and only
when lesser sanctions have failed.84 Moreover, if a default judgment
is awarded, it is limited to the amount stated in the complaint.8 5
E. Contempt Sanctions
The new law concerning contempt sanctions is broader than the
former statute. The old law listed three instances in which contempt
sanctions could be awarded,8 6 including refusal to obey a lawful sub-
poena to attend a deposition or be sworn as a witness,8 7 refusal to at-
tend a session in court,8 8 and refusal to obey a court order.8 9 The
current law provides that the court may treat the misuse of the dis-
covery process as a contempt of court and impose a contempt sanc-
tion accordingly. 90 This broad approach mirrors the federal system,91
82. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(b)(4)(D) (West Supp. 1988).
83. Fred Howland Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. App. 2d 605, 611-12, 53 Cal. Rptr.
341, 346 (1966) (personal injury suit wherein defendant failed to answer interrogatories
because defendant had a conflict of interest with his attorney and could not retain
counsel in time. The defendant's answer was stricken and default judgment entered in
the lower court. Id. at 606, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 342-43. The court held that default judg-
ment was unjust since a monetary award would have more appropriately compensated
the plaintiff for the delay. Id. at 612, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 346.).
84. Thomas v. Luong, 187 Cal. App. 3d 76, 81-82, 231 Cal. Rptr. 631, 633-34 (1986)
(personal injury action arising out of an auto accident wherein defendant failed to ap-
pear at a deposition and answer interrogatories. The lower court struck defendant's
answer and entered default judgment for the plaintiff. Id at 80, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
The court held that the default judgment exceeded what was reasonably required to
protect the injured party and was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 82, 231 Cal. Rptr. at
634.); Scherrer v. Plaza Marina Commercial Corp., 16 Cal. App. 3d 520, 523, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 85, 87 (1971) (action to recover a real estate commission associated with the sale
of certain real estate coupled with a cross-claim of indemnity, wherein neither witness
nor witness' attorney appeared at two depositions, a pretrial conference, and a motion
to strike the answer to a cross-complaint resulting in the defendant's answer being
struck and default entered. The court held that the default judgment was proper. Id.
at 524, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 88.).
85. Greenup v. Rodman, 42 Cal. 3d 822, 826, 726 P.2d 1295, 1297, 231 Cal. Rptr. 220,
222 (1986) (action of minority shareholders against majority shareholders of a dissolved
corporation to recover for fraudulent transfer of assets, wherein defendant failed to
answer questions at a deposition due to his reasoning that since it was Lincoln's birth-
day, it was a legal holiday. Id. at 825, 726 P.2d at 1296, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 221. In 'addi-
tion, defendant, while laughing, produced papers requested by plaintiff in a box filled
with straw and horse excrement. After looking through the box, defendant told plain-
tiff's counsel and the court reporter to wash their hands thoroughly since it was
treated with a toxic chemical. The lower court granted plaintiff's motion to strike de-
fendant's answer and to enter default. The court then held that a default judgment
amount was limited to the quantity specified in the prayer.). Id.
86. Former CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(b)(1).
87. Id. § 2034(b)(1)(i).
88. Id. § 2034(b)(1)(ii).
89. Id. § 2034(b)(1)(iii).
90. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(b)(5) (West Supp. 1988).
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and means effectively that any misuse of the discovery process might
result in contempt sanctions. In contrast, under the prior law, the
misuse had to involve either a breach of a discovery order or failure
to make a court or deposition appearance. 92
Unlike the former law,93 the new law does not treat contempt
sanctions differently from the other sanctions. In particular, the
prior law held that contempt sanctions could not be coupled with
other sanctions since this would amount to double punishment.94
The new law, on the other hand, groups the contempt sanction along
with the other sanctions.95 Thus, the imposition of sanctions can be
imposed along with other sanctions without constituting double
punishment.96
Whether contempt sanctions will require the "willfulness" of the
actor, the approach under the old law, remains an open question. 97
Although the new statute does not expressly require willful intent on
behalf of the non-moving party, case law has generally required such
a showing even in the absence of language to this effect in the former
statute.98 One argument is that by failing to specify willfulness in
the statute, the Joint Commission intended to eliminate the require-
ment. On the other hand, the omission of the word "willful" in the
statute might be seen as a confirmation of former case law. In light
of the severity of the sanction and its effect upon the non-moving
party, the better view is that some form of willfulness must be estab-
lished prior to awarding contempt sanctions.
V. THE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 128.5 TO PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
A question remains whether section 128.599 applies to pretrial dis-
covery or is limited to trial and post-trial matters. This issue arises
because the new California Discovery Act has been declared as the
91. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note of 1970 to subdivision (b).
92. Former CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
93. The contempt sanction was considered in a whole different category than the
other sanctions. See THE RUrrER GROUP, supra note 5, §§ 8:1066-8:1067.
94. See id. § 8:740.
95. It is considered one of five different types of sanctions. See id. § 8:1066.
96. Id.
97. See 2 J. DEMEO, supra note 21, §§ 42.10[5][b]-[6].
98. Id.
99. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West Supp. 1988). The statute provides:
(a) Every trial court may order a party, the party's attorney, or both to pay
any reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party
as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended
to cause unnecessary delay. This section also applies to judicial arbitration
law governing all pretrial discovery. 00 The better approach is to con-
sider section 128.5 outside the scope of the new Act, and thus still ap-
plicable to pretrial discovery.' 0 ' This view is supported by the
statutory language of section 128.5. The statute provides that sanc-
tions can be levied pursuant to section 128.5 in addition to any other
liability imposed by law,102 thus indicating that monetary sanctions
awarded under this section can be added to other sanctions, such as
those under section 2023. Moreover, the former law allowed an over-
lap between former section 2034 and section 128.5.103
The significance of having these two mechanisms for recovering
monetary sanctions is that they have different requirements. In sec-
tion 128.5, "frivolous" is defined as totally and completely without
merit, or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.'0 4 Sec-
tion 128.5 applies exclusively to parties in the litigation, whereas sec-
tion 2023 applies to anyone. 10 5 Moreover, section 128.5 does not
contain the "meet and confer" prerequisite embodied in section
proceedings under Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 1141.10) of Title 3 of
Part 3.
(b) For purposes of this section:
(1) "Actions or tactics" include, but are not limited to, the making or op-
posing of motions or the filing and service of a complaint or cross-complaint.
The mere filing of a complaint without service thereof on an opposing party
does not constitute "actions or tactics" for purposes of this section.
(2) "Frivolous" means (A) totally and completely without merit or (B) for
the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.
(c) Expenses pursuant to this section shall not be imposed except on no-
tice contained in a party's moving or responding papers; or the court's own
motion, after notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing expenses
shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justi-
fying the order.
(d) The liability imposed by this section is in addition to any other liability
imposed by law for acts or omissions within the purview of this section.
Id.
100. See DEERING'S CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: SPECIAL DISCOVERY
ACT PAMPHLET, supra note 1, at 5.
101. See 2 J. DEMEO, supra note 21, § 42.11 (1987); see also Lesser v. Huntington
Harbor Corp., 173 Cal. App. 3d 926, 219 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1986). The court mentions that
"nothing in section 128.5's language limits the section's application only to tactics or
motions.... [A] reasonable interpretation is that the section also applies to entire ac-
tions not based on good faith which are frivolous or cause unnecessary delay in the
resolution of a dispute." Id. at 930, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
102. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West Supp. 1988).
103. Guzman v. Hamblen Gauge Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 438, 446, 201 Cal. Rptr. 246,
251 (1984) (dictum stating that sanctions may be imposed, in appropriate circum-
stances, under § 128.5 and § 2034).
104. See supra note 99 and accompanying text; see also In re Marriage of Flaherty,
31 Cal. 3d 637, 649-50, 646 P.2d 179, 185, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508, 516 (1982) (dissolution of
marriage action involving dispute about child custody wherein the father's attorney
was fined $500.00 for appealing the trial court orders. The appellate court held that the
appeal was not frivolous since it raised substantial questions of family law and was not
subjectively brought in bad faith. Id. at 651, 646 P.2d at 179, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 508.).
105. See supra note 57.
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2023.106
Although the two sections may overlap, it is unlikely that such an
instance will occur very often. The standards for determining what
actions are "frivolous" demand a clear and definite showing of mis-
use.'07 Also, sanctions awarded under section 128.5 tend to be used
"most sparingly to deter only the most egregious conduct."'Lo8 There-
fore, practitioners should note that section 128.5 is still applicable to
pretrial discovery. However, the extent to which it will apply, either
alone or in conjunction with section 2023, is limited.
VI. MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING SANCTIONS
In determining whether a court will impose sanctions in any given
situation, four factors should be considered. First, the imposition of
sanctions is always subject to due process.109 Under prior law, it has
been held that:
[w]hile under the statute the court undoubtedly has the power to impose a
sanction which will accomplish the purpose of discovery, when its order goes
beyond that and denies a party any right to defend the action or to present
evidence upon issues of fact which are entirely unaffected by the discovery
procedure before it, it not only abuses its discretion but deprives the recalci-
trant party of due process of law.1 1 0
Before imposing sanctions, the statute provides that notice must be
given to the affected party, person, or attorney, in addition to an op-
portunity for a hearing."' If the non-moving party has not received
due process, it is an abuse of the court's discretion to award the
sanction.112
Second, it should be remembered that the option of imposing sanc-
tions is left within the court's discretion by virtue of the statutory use
of the word "may. 11 3 Consequently, the prior court procedure re-
106. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
107. 2 J. DEMEO, supra note 21, § 42.11[1][b].
108. Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d at 651, 646 P.2d at 188, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
109. See generally J. HOGAN, MODERN CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY 3D (1981).
110. Caryl Richards, Inc. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 2d 300, 305, 10 Cal. Rptr.
377, 381 (1961) (products liability action to recover for damages suffered to plaintiff's
eyes when defendant manufacturer's hair-spray had been sprayed into them. The de-
fendant refused a court order to disclose the exact formula of the hair-spray and the
court entered a default judgment. The appellate court held that the sanction of default
was too severe in that it prevented defendant from defending the action properly).
111. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(b) (West Supp. 1988).
112. See generally J. HOGAN, supra note 109.
113. The word "may" is used in the first half of section 2023(b)1 which provides:
The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the
misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both
pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as
garding the imposition of more severe sanctions, such as issue, evi-
dence or terminating sanctions, can be studied to determine the court
procedure regarding them.114
Third, courts will avoid, where possible, imposing issue, evidence,
or terminating sanctions because they are outcome-determinative of
the litigation.115 Under the former law, courts hesitated before im-
posing these types of sanctions, reasoning that the client should not
have to pay for the sins of the attorney.116 In effect, the courts fol-
lowed, and perhaps continue to follow, a conservative approach by
rarely imposing more than a minor monetary sanction.
Finally, sanctions can only be imposed if they are reasonably calcu-
lated to effect compliance with proper discovery procedures, and are
not imposed solely for punitive purposes. 117
These four considerations indicate that, although the new statute
reflects an increased willingness on the part of the legislature to al-
low the courts to impose sanctions, the ordering of sanctions has its
limits. California case law has identified the concerns of ensuring
due process, of avoiding punitive sanctions, and of cautiously applying
sanctions that are outcome-determinative of the litigation. These
concerns suggest that courts are still bound by constraints outside of
those specified in the new statute. Consequently, practitioners
should note that sanctions can still be avoided on other grounds not
specified in the new statute.
VII. REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS
Section 2023(c)118 effectively repeals the 1987 California Rule of
a result of that conduct. The court may also impose this sanction on one un-
successfully asserting that another has engaged in the misuse of the discovery
process, or on any attorney who advised that assertion, or on both.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2023(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
114. See generally THE RUTTER GROUP, supra note 5, § 8:1070.
115. CEB, supra note 8, § 1.4.
116. THE RUTTER GROUP, supra note 5, §§ 8:1079-8:1082.
117. Motown Records Corp. v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 482, 490-91, 202 Cal.
Rptr. 227, 233 (1984) (civil action wherein plaintiff failed to timely comply with a court
order requesting a factual showing of the basis for the claims. Plaintiff asserted that
certain key documents were protected by the attorney-client and the attorney-work
product privileges. Consequently, plaintiff was fined $1,000.00 which was to pay for de-
fendant's attorney fees. The appellate court held that the sanctions imposed were ex-
cessive since they were not reasonably calculated to achieve effective compliance with
discovery and, as such, were punitive in nature.).
118. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2023(c) (West Supp. 1988). The section states:
A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person,
party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought and specify the type
of sanction sought. The notice of motion shall be supported by a memoran-
dum of points and authorities, and accompanied by a declaration setting forth
facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought.
Id.
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Court 341.119 The statute provides that a request for sanctions must
include three items: (1) a notice of motion, (2) memorandum of
points and authorities, and (3) a declaration.12o
The notice of motion must identify every person, party, and attor-
ney against whom the sanction is sought, and must specify the type of
sanction sought.121 In addition, it must be supported by a memoran-
dum of points and authorities and a declaration setting forth facts
stating the amount of any monetary sanction sought. 122
VIII. CONCLUSION
Section 2023 of the new California Discovery Act effects significant
changes in the former law. By listing various misuses, the new law
will add predictability and clarity to the system, and provide judges
with clear guidelines regarding the imposition of sanctions. The ad-
aptation of the "meet and confer" requirement makes informal coop-
eration amongst parties, generally through their attorneys, a high
priority. This will also serve to undermine much of the advantage
that large firms have in being able to burden small firms and sole
practitioners with excess paperwork. Monetary sanctions, which fol-
low the federal approach, are easier to apply and provide a stronger
deterrent in pretrial discovery than other sanctions.
However, changes in the statute are only half the picture. The
other half is the judiciary which has the power to make the new
sanction provision a viable deterrent, instead of merely a paper ti-
ger.12 3 Unless judges show advocates that sanctions will be imposed
more frequently and more severely, attorneys will continue to misuse
the pretrial discovery process. Moreover, absent gross and willful
conduct, attorneys will be comfortable in the knowledge that sanc-
tions will follow the trend of the former law and not be forthcoming.
Even though the legislature has constructed a credible deterrent, it
119. CAL. R. CT. 341. The rule states: "A request for sanctions in discovery matters
shall'name all parties and attorneys against whom sanctions are being sought, set forth
facts supporting the amount, and state statutory or case authority." Id.
120. See supra note 119.
121. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(c) (West Supp. 1988). The statute seems to indi-
cate that more than one type of sanction may be imposed. Consequently, although the
usage of the language here is singular, it is best to list all types of sanctions sought if
more than one is sought. See also supra note 119.
122. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(c) (West Supp. 1988).
123. J. HOGAN, supra note 109, § 14.04. See also Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A
Judicial Perspective, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 264 (1979).
will remain lifeless unless the judiciary employs it to its fullest
potential.
The general policy of conservatism 124 surrounding the imposition
of sanctions must be overcome if sanctions are to play a vital and ac-
tive role in deterring misuses of pretrial discovery. This is not to say
that sanctions must always be imposed; rather, judges must be more
willing to use them as an instrument to deter discovery abuse. 125
The conservatism with which lesser sanctions are currently imposed
is indicative of the judiciary's perception that even these sanctions
are punishment.126 A change which will minimize the misuses of
pretrial discovery procedures is due, and will only occur with the ju-
diciary's resolve.
TIMOTHY MICHAEL DONOVAN*
124. See generally Comment, supra note 7.
125. See generally Sherwood, supra note 7.
126. Comment, supra note 7, at 389. [appendix attached.]
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